This paper presents an endogenous growth model with intertemporally dependent preferences and "Ak" technology. We derive sufficient conditions for a balanced growth path to be an equilibrium, provide a full characterization of the equilibrium dynamics of the economy, and explore the implications of habit formation for the patterns of cross-country growth and convergence. Finally, we show that the alternative departure from the standard assumption of isoelastic preferences represented by the use of a Stone-Geary utility function can be interpreted as a special case of the model with habit formation. Our results highlight the importance of preferences in the dynamics of growth, a point neglected in most of the literature.
Introduction
This paper presents an endogenous growth model that departs from the assumption of time-separable, constant intertemporal elasticity of substitution (CIES) preferences almost ubiquitous in the literature. The idea, shared with Ryder and Heal (1973) , is rather that it is intuitively plausible to assume that past consumption choices and/or the social environment affect the utility an individual derives from consuming a given bundle of goods. Therefore, we assume that the representative agent's instantaneous utility u is determined by comparing current consumption c to some reference stock, or standard, z, called alternatively "consumption experience", "habits", or "customary consumption", so that u(c, z). With z taken to be a weighted average of past consumption levels, this choice leads to preferences that Ryder and Heal termed "intertemporally dependent".
These preferences represent a tractable departure from the hypothesis of a time-separable utility function and have been used in a variety of different contexts. To mention just a few, Ryder and Heal (1973) and Boyer (1975 Boyer ( , 1978 investigated their implications for the neoclassical optimal growth model, showing that they lead to a richer dynamic behavior of the main variables around an unchanged steady-state (the modified golden rule). Time non-separable preferences can help to reconcile rational choice theory with apparently irrational behavior (Becker and Murphy, 1983) , to explain various time-series features of consumption data (Deaton, 1992) , and to shed light on open economy macroeconomic issues (Obstfeld, 1992; Mansoorian, 1993) . Finally, time nonseparable preferences have more recently been used in finance, often in the attempt to resolve the "equity premium puzzle" (Constantinides, 1990 , Abel, 1990 , Gali, 1994 , Boldrin et al., 1997 , Campbell and Cochrane, 1999 , and in business cycle research (Lettau and Uhlig, 2000 , Ljungqvist and Uhlig, 2000 , Otrok, 2001 ). This paper is closely related to Carroll, Overland and Weil (1997, 2000) , and the results we derive complement those obtained in their two papers. The first one (Carroll et al., 1997) analyzes the implications of different assumptions about the way in which the representative agent's stock of habits evolves over time, showing that the steady state growth rate of the economy and, at least qualitatively, the transitional dynamics toward the balanced growth path are the same both under "external habits" -where the stock of habits is a weighted average of the aggregate per-capita past consumption levels -and under "internal habits" -that is, when an individual's habits are accumulated by his own consumption. The companion paper (Carroll et al., 2000) investigates the important implications of habit-forming pref-erences for understanding the growth-to-saving causality apparent in the data.
Although we assume the same basic set-up -intertemporally dependent preferences of the Ryder and Heal's variety, and a one-sector, closed economy with linear technology -investigated by Carroll, Overland and Weil in the papers just mentioned, the analysis that follows differs from theirs both in emphasis and generality.
In fact, rather than assuming from the outset a specific functional form for the instantaneous utility function, as these authors do, we work with a generic u, and provide sufficient conditions for a balanced growth path to qualify as an equilibrium when preferences are intertemporally dependent and habits "internal". This also allows us to unveil the difference between the "adjacent" and "distant" complementarity cases, and the ensuing dynamics, which is central to most of the literature on habit formation. Under adjacent complementarity, an increase in consumption experience induces the individual to want to increase current consumption, so that c and z will be positively related in equilibrium. The opposite is true when preferences are such that complementarity is distant. We choose to focus mainly on the case of adjacent complementarity, as we regard the addictive behavior it implies as more relevant in the one-sector framework we consider, where c has to be interpreted as consumption of a wide bundle of goods. 1 Nevertheless, our analysis also encompasses the opposite case of complementarity, and all the results we present can be readily extended to consider the implications of this alternative behavioral assumption.
Second, rather than transforming the problem in terms of state-like and control-like variables, we study the problem by introducing detrended variables, as in Caballé and Santos (1993) , and by linearizing the dynamic system around the steady state. This allows us to obtain simple explicit solutions for the implied time paths of the main variables. Furthermore, we adapt and extend a graphical device first introduced by Obstfeld (1992) in his analysis of the external adjustment of a small open economy with habits in the utility function, to provide a pictorial representation of the equilibrium dynamics resulting from our growth model with intertemporally dependent preferences. This representation is, we believe, both simple and transparent, and helps to grasp in an intuitive way the somewhat tangled interactions among variables that set in under habit formation.
Finally, having provided a full characterization of the equilibrium under internal habits, we specialize the utility function, assuming intertemporally dependent preferences belonging to the "subtractive" class first studied by Constantinides (1990) . This assumption allows us to derive explicit solutions -valid globally, and not just in a neighborhood of the steady-state growth path -for the equilibrium paths of the main variables, to assume heterogeneity across individuals in initial habits and capital holdings, and to study the distributive dynamics implied by intertemporally dependent preferences. In particular, we show that these preferences can generate a variety of outcomes (including divergence, convergence, and overtaking) for the time evolution of the ratio of individual capital to the mean, or average, capital in the economy, and that the initial distribution of habits and capital holdings across individuals determines whether inequality will increase or decrease along the process of economic growth. These effects are absent in the standard time separable case (Rebelo, 1991) , where there is no transitional dynamics and the distribution of wealth does not change over time, and richer than those stemming from the assumption of a Stone-Geary instantaneous utility function, a different departure from the hypothesis of CIES preferences.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 introduces the concepts of equilibrium adopted and gives sufficient conditions for the existence of a steady-state, balanced growth path. In Section 4, through a normalization of variables, we transform our original problem into one that involves only variables that take on constant values in balanced growth, and provide a full characterization of the equilibrium dynamics of the latter. In Section 5 we present a graphical device that helps determine the equilibrium dynamics of the economy starting from an arbitrary set of initial conditions on the state variables, and provide the economic intuition for the transitional dynamics implied by intertemporally dependent preferences. In Section 6 we present an example of instantaneous utility function belonging to the intertemporally dependent class, and discuss the implications of our model for the evolution of the cross-section of capital holdings. Section 7 concludes.
The model
We study a closed economy with an unbounded horizon, populated by many infinitely lived, identical individuals. 2 The typical agent has preferences defined over his own consumption c, as well as on consumption experience, or habits, z, and maximizes the objective functional:
where u is the instantaneous felicity function, and δ the (positive and constant) rate of time preference.
As in Ryder and Heal (1973) , we assume that consumption experience is a weighted average of the representative individual's past consumption levels c,
where ρ > 0 is a constant that measures the rate of habit adjustment, and z(0) = z 0 > 0 is the exogenously inherited standard of living at the initial date. 3 Differentiating equation (2) with respect to time, it follows that habits evolve according toż
2 In particular, individuals have the same preferences, have access to the same technology that will be specified below, and share the same initial conditions on the state variables. This latter assumption will be relaxed in Section 6, where we allow for heterogeneity in initial conditions across individuals.
3 A substantial modification would stem from the assumption that the representative agent's stock of habits is a weighted average of the aggregate per-capita (or average, or the Joneses') past consumption levels χ, rather than of his own past consumption c. The implications of this alternative assumption are studied by Carroll et al. (1997) . Since the representative agent takes χ as given, although χ = c must hold in equilibrium, this modification introduces a "consumption externality" that breaks the equivalence between the centralized and competitive solutions of the model, with potential policy implications which are absent when habits are defined as in (2) . Aside from this, the assumption that habits are accumulated by c, χ, or by a weighted average of the two does not change the steady state growth rate of the economy, and does not lead to qualitatively different transitional dynamics to the balanced growth path that are the main object of the present paper.
We impose the following conditions on the instantaneous felicity function u, assumed to be twice continuously differentiable:
Assumption U2 restricts preferences to the intertemporally dependent class, and Assumption U3 amounts to the requirement of concavity of u in (c, z), and strict concavity in c.
Finally, and as we will show in footnote 7 below, Assumption U4 (which, given Assumption U1, is always satisfied whenever u happens to be an increasing function of z) guarantees that a uniformly maintained increase in the level of consumption along a balanced growth path will increase utility.
There is only one good, which can be either consumed or invested, and whose output at each point in time is the result of the linear production function
where y and k are per-capita output and capital, respectively, and A is a positive constant. 4 We assume that individuals directly operate the economy's technology. Omitting from now on time indices whenever this choice does not risk confusion, it follows that the representative agent faces the budget constraint:k
where, for simplicity, depreciation of physical capital has been assumed away -or incorporated in A. Constraint (5) captures the fact that, in the closed economy with no outside assets and identical individuals we are about to study, capital accumulation is the only possible use of savings. Finally, in order to be able to retrieve the standard "Ak"-results as a special case of our model, we also assume:
T1. A > δ. 4 Needless to say, (4) can also be interpreted as a reduced form production function, which captures the essence of "convex" models of endogenous growth. For instance, the same results obtained below would be valid by allowing capital to differ between physical an human capital, and with the ratio between the initial endowments of the two types of capital equal to the steady state one. If the ratio between initial conditions happened to be different from the steady state one, this would induce further transitional dynamics.
Equilibrium
Given the above definitions and assumptions, we have the following definitions of optimal allocation of resources and balanced-growth equilibrium, respectively. 
Definition 1. An optimal allocation of resources is a set of paths {c(t), z(t), k(t)} that solve the maximization problem:
That c, k and z will grow at a common rate g in balanced equilibrium, as stated in Definition 2, can be readily verified by dividing the laws of motion of physical capital and habits by k and z respectively, and noting that the resulting growth rates of these variables will be constant if and only if the ratios c/k and c/z are also constant. As seems to be the rule in growth models where the utility function depends on a stock variable, Proposition 1 states that homogeneity of the instantaneous felicity function of the degree ν implicitly defined by equation (6) is a sufficient condition for a balanced growth path to qualify as an equilibrium. 5 In the proof of this Proposition given in Appendix 1, we also show that, when the economy evolves along this balanced path, one must have
for the transversality conditions associated with problem (P1) to be satisfied. In other words, the steady state growth rate has to be less than the maximum "sustainable" rate that would be associated with zero consumption (see (5)). Finally, it should be noted that, although Proposition 1 gives conditions under which a balanced path qualifies as an equilibrium, it does not imply that the economy will ever converge to it. In the next Section, we will place on u additional restrictions to make sure that the economy asymptotically approaches a steady state with constant, positive growth.
The Transformed Problem
Given the above results, from now on we shall assume an instantaneous utility function homogenous of degree ν < 1. This assumption also allows us to reformulate problem (P1) in a way that greatly simplifies the analysis, and to give a graphical representation of the equilibrium evolution of the economy. To this end, following Caballé and Santos (1993), we introduce the normalized variablesc
These new variables will remain constant along a balanced path, and {c * ,z * ,k * } will denote their steady-state, balanced growth values. They will also be referred to as "de-trended" variables, since the normalization factor e −gt removes from the non-normalized ones the exponential growth trend that these latter will exhibit in a balanced equilibrium.
Next, we exploit the degree-ν homogeneity of u to transform (1) into a function of (c,z):
Writing the dynamic constraints in terms of de-trended consumption, habits, and physical capital, we are in a position to reformulate (P1) as follows:
and to write the corresponding current-value Hamiltonian function:
The necessary conditions:
are, with the laws of motion ofk andz, also sufficient for a maximum if the following transversality conditions are met:
While the co-state variableλ is the shadow value of normalized capital, µ, that -from (11) -can be written as
is the shadow value of an additional unit ofz. Condition (9) implies that, along an optimal path, at each time t the current marginal utility of consumption, plus the contribution of greater time-t consumption to the utility stream derived from future consumption experience -a contribution that is positive if uz > 0, and negative in the opposite case -must be equal to the time-t shadow value of capital. We define the sum (uc + ρμ) "the time-t full marginal benefit ofc" to distinguish the present setting from the standard time-independent case, where the contribution of greater time-t consumption to the objective functional is given by the term uc only.
In the steady state, condition (10) requires
a positive quantity by (7) . Using (8), it follows that:
an expression that gives the same steady state growth rate of the economy derived in Proposition 1. From these results, it can be immediately verified thatλ will be constant at all times, at a level that we shall denote byλ * and whose expression will be derived below.
The differentiation of (9) with respect to time, using (10) and (11) and taking into account the laws of motion ofz andk, results in the following autonomous system of differential equations in (c,z,k):
From the last two equations, the steady state levels of the detrended habits and capital are:
To derivec * , notice that (14a) implies that, in the steady state,
a positive quantity. 6 Being (z * /c * ) = ρ ρ+g , homogeneity of degree (ν − 1) of uc and uz implies that the left hand side of the above equation is equal
We show in Appendix 2 thatc * , and thereforeλ * ,z * andk * , are uniquely pinned down by the need to satisfy the transversality conditions (12) , given the initial conditions on the state variables. This result, and the assumptions placed on u, imply that the steady-state equilibrium just derived is unique. 7 To investigate the dynamic evolution of the economy and the stability properties of the steady state just characterized, in Appendix 2 we linearize system (14) around the steady state (15) , and show that this latter is a saddlepoint provided that
where starred derivatives are evaluated at the steady state. The crucial role played by the sign and size of j in determining the dynamic evolution of consumption and habits in a model with intertemporally dependent preferences was first pointed out by Ryder and Heal (1973) . In their terminology, one has "adjacent complementarity" -that is, complementarity between consumption at adjacent dates, a property of preferences that Becker and Murphy (1988) identify with addiction -if j > 0, and "distant complementarity" if j < 0. Notice that assumption U3 implies that j is always negative if ucz < 0. To have j > 0, one needs ucz > 0 and large enough. When this is the case, condition (16) places an upper bound on the degree of adjacent complementarity consistent with saddlepath stability of system (15) . We show in Appendix 2 that values of j that violate condition (16) lead to instability, or to a violation of the hypothesis of concavity of u; both instances are ruled out by assumption in the present analysis, so that (16) always holds. . To see what this latter implies, let us assume that the economy is on a balanced growth path, with consumption and habits growing over time at a constant, positive rate g, and consider the two sequences {c(t), z(t)} ∞ t=s and {c (t), z (t)} ∞ t=s , with c (s) > c(s) andċ(t)/c(t) =ċ (t)/c (t) = g, t = s, ..., ∞. Assumption U4 amounts to the (in our opinion, sensible) requirement that the second sequence will yield greater utility to the individual. Notice that this assumption is the generalization to a growth setting of the non-satiation condition in Ryder and Heal (1973, p.3) .
For this case, in the same Appendix we show that equilibrium-normalized consumption, habits and physical capital evolve according to:
where −ψ is the negative, real characteristic root associated with the linearized version of system (14), and
While ω 2 > 0 always, in Appendix 2 we prove that ω 1 has the same sign as j. We also show that steady state de-trended consumption is given by:
whilez * andk * , which are increasing inc * , can be computed using (18) in equations (15a) and (15b). 8 Finally, the difference between optimal time-0 and steady-state normalized consumption that appears in (17a) can be written as:c
8 When complementarity is adjacent -ω1, j > 0 -the linearization imposes an upper bound on the value that the ratio of initial conditions may take on. Namely, and as is clear from (18) , for an optimal program to exist, (z0/k0) has to be less than
]. Values of (z0/k0) above this quantity imply so much consumption at time t = 0 thatc,k,z become zero in finite time. In terms of the diagrams we introduce in Section 5, for a given k0 one finds the maximum stock of initial habits consistent with the existence of an equilibrium as the value of z0 that, in Figure 1 , generates a saddlepath SS in the upper quadrant crossing the Equations (17)- (19) imply the following facts about the equilibrium dynamics associated with the solution of the transformed problem (P1') Proposition 2 In equilibrium: 
The opposite conclusion holds when j < 0; In what follows, and although our analysis can readily be adapted to analyze the implications of the existence of distant complementarity, we shall focus on the case in which complementarity is adjacent, that we regard as most relevant. A positive j is also assumed, implicitly or explicitly, in all the papers employing habit-forming preferences in the growth and in the asset pricing literature. In fact, the two most commonly used intertemporally dependent specifications of preferences are the multiplicative formulation (cz −γ ) 1−σ /(1 − σ), introduced in the asset pricing literature by Abel (1990) and used in a growth setting by Carroll et al. (1997) , and the subtractive one -(c − bz) 1−σ /(1 − σ) -first analyzed by Constantinides (1990) . The latter -that has also been used, among the others, by Barlevy (2003) , Boldrin et al. (1997) , Campbell and Cochrane (1999), Detemple and Zapatero (1991) and Jermann (1998) -seems to be the most popular one in the asset pricing literature, probably because it turns out to be consistent with a negative correlation between the equity premium and the cycle (Campbell and Cochrane, 1999). As we shall point out in Section 6, j is always positive in the subtractive case; complementarity turns out to be adjacent also in Abel (1990) -where the condition j > 0 reduces to u cz > 0, since he assumes that habits are external -as well as, for the assumed parameters values, in the other papers using a multiplicative utility function, where the fact that preferences are such that j > 0 plays a major role in the proposed explanations of the equity premium puzzle. Finally, and going back to the conditions for balanced growth in our Proposition 1, it is worth noting that both the multiplicative and the subtractive instantaneous utility functions are homogeneous, and that the values at which preferences parameters are usually set in the asset pricing literature (values often used to solve numerically the model) are such that the implied degree of homogeneity of these functions is indeed less than one. 9 
Picturing Transitional Dynamics
In this Section, we modify and extend a technique used by Obstfeld (1992) and draw a simple diagram to illustrate the transitional dynamics implied by our model and to provide the economic intuition for the results derived so far, and summarized in Proposition 2.
Assuming for the reasons mentioned above j > 0, in Figure 1 we draw four loci: -the relationship between steady state levels of normalized habits and physical capital that is implied by (14a) and (14b) -the straight line 9 We thank a referee for suggesting us to check the consistency between the sufficient conditions for balanced growth derived above and the parameters restrictions usually imposed in the asset pricing literature. As for the requirement A > g, it is difficult to find an exact counterpart for it in models that are sometimes laid down in a partial equilibrium setting, assume uncertainty and more than one asset, and that often abstract from long term growth. However, being an optimality condition (or, since it coincides with a "bounded utility" condition, a prerequisite for the very existence of an optimal program), an equivalent condition is -and must be -valid in all those papers, and explicitly or implicitly imposed.
emanating from the origin in the lower quadrant, with slope
It should be noted that those shown in the figure are not standard phase diagrams. This is because the steady state levels ofc,z andk -and, with them, the location of the two saddlepaths SS and T T -depend on the set of initial conditions (z 0 , k 0 ), as is clear from (17)- (19) .
To understand how this graphical device helps determine the equilibrium dynamics for arbitrary initial conditions on the stock variables, let us assume that the economy starts out with the pair (z 0 , k 0 ) given by point T in the lower quadrant of the figure. Notice that the assumed configuration of initial conditions is such that (z 0 /k 0 ) < (a positive quantity, under adjacent complementarity); finally, one determines the optimal time-0 choice of consumption,c 0 , as the value ofc that, along this line, is associated with the assumed z 0 .
From the figure, it is clear that, as stated in Proposition 1, a stable dynamics calls for levels of normalized consumption, habits, and physical capital rising over time. In fact, being (z 0 /k 0 ) < ρ (A−g) ρ+g , optimal time-0 consumption is lower than the level (A − g)k 0 which -through (14c) -would yieldk(0) = 0, and point S is located above the (ż = 0)-locus. It follows that both normalized physical capital and habits will be increasing at time zero. The next instant -which, for simplicity, we call t = 1 -the economy will therefore start off with larger beginning-of-periodk andz. All other things being equal, a larger capital stock will exert a positive wealth effect on time-1 consumption,c 1 . In addition, under adjacent complementarity the individual has a further incentive to raise his consumption level at time t = 1 because of the increase in the stock of habits. For both reasons,c 1 >c 0.
To understand why an increase inz leads to an increase in the optimal choice ofc, notice that (13) implies that what we have termed the "full marginal benefit" of current consumption can be written as:
Since, for s > t, one has
the derivative with respect toz(t) of (20) is 10 :
Evaluated at the steady state, (21) reduces to
an expression which has the same sign as j. It follows that, in the local analysis of the equilibrium dynamics under adjacent complementarity we are carrying out, the full marginal benefit ofc will move in the same direction asz, and the individual has an incentive to increasec whenz rises.
Having shown that, for the assumed configuration of initial conditions, c 1 >c 0 , it is straightforward to verify that, at time t = 1, this higher level of consumption is still consistent with the accumulation of capital and habits, although at a slower rate than in the previous period. The same process is repeated the next instant and the economy converges over time to the steady state (S , T ) along the arrowed paths in the two quadrants.
Suppose now that the economy starts off with an unchanged level of physical capital, but with a z 0 > z 0 . If, as assumed in the figure, this increase in initial consumption experience is such that (z 0 /k 0 ) is still less than the critical level ρ (A−g) ρ+g , we end up with the new saddlepaths given by the dashed lines labeled S S and T T , and with lower steady state levels ofc,z and k.
That the steady state levels of the variables are decreasing in z 0 when j > 0 simply reflects the higher marginal benefit of consumption associated with higher initial habits. The individual will consume more at time 0, and will accumulate less capital 11 . This smaller accumulation will -via a wealth effect -cause a smaller increase in consumption, and therefore 10 This step involves the computation of the "Volterra derivative" of the functional in (20) . For a definition of Volterra derivatives, see Ryder and Heal (1973, pp. 3-4) .
11 Thatc0 is increasing inz0 simply reflects the fact that consumption is increasing in habits under adjacent complementarity. It follows that, as shown in the Figure, point S is located to the north-east of point S. This can be proved as follows. First, evaluate at time t = 0 the expressions for the two loci T T and SS , habits, during the transition to the steady state, as well as lower levels of the variables in the new balanced growth equilibrium (S , T ).
On the other hand, when z 0 happens to be so large that
ρ+g , the whole dynamics is reversed. As shown in Figure 2 , under adjacent complementarity the individual will choose to consume so much at time zero thatk will be decumulated (c 0 > (A − g)k 0 ). De-trended habits will decrease as well, since the economy starts off at point S, which is now below theż = 0 locus: although the individual consumes a lot, the optimal initial choice of consumption -one that is consistent with the transversality condition onk -does not add to consumption experience enough to compensate for the depreciation term (ρ + g)z 0 , which is large because z 0 is large. In this case, normalized consumption, habits and physical capital will decrease over time toward their steady-state levels.
The same diagram can be used to determine the effects of changes in k 0 for a given z 0 . For instance, and going back to Figure 1 , an increase in k 0 would cause a parallel, downward shift of the T T locus and an upward shift of the SS locus, thus leading to an increase both in the initial optimal choice ofc, and in the steady state levels of the three variables on the axes. If the initial configuration of initial conditions is the one shown in Figure 2 , an increase in k 0 such that the ratio (z 0 /k 0 ) remains above the critical value ρ+g , the economy jumps immediately on the steady state. In general, however, consumption, habits and physical capital converge to a balanced growth path increasing or decreasing over time, depending on whether
differentiate totally the first expression, setting dk0 = 0 and dk
dz0. Finally, differentiation of the second expression, using
> 0. The same result can be derived, in a more straightforward fashion, using the explicit expression for c0 given by (A.2.12) in Appendix 2. 
S' S T T' z(t)
Finally, the results one gets under the standard assumption of timeseparable preferences can be retrieved as a special case of our model.
To see this, first notice that, if uz = ucz = 0, so that Assumption U2 is violated, one hasμ = 0, uc =λ * , ∀t. It follows that the right-hand side of equation (14a) is zero, and the saddlepaths SS and T T become flat at the levels of consumptionc = (A − g)k 0 and capitalk = k 0 , respectively. Regardless of initial conditions, this implies that de-trended consumption and physical capital will be constant over time, and that -as in the standard "Ak" model -c and k will always grow at the steady-state rate g = Up to this point, we have provided a full characterization of the equilibrium dynamics of what we have termed "normalized", or "de-trended", variables. In order to go from the latter to the behavior over time of "actual" consumption, habits, capital, and output, one has simply to remember that the generic variable x is related to its normalized counterpartx according to x = e gtx , or, in terms of growth rates:
Since normalized variables converge monotonically over time to a steady state where they take on constant values, the growth rate of the actual ones will converge asymptotically to g. In the transition, their growth rate will be above or below this value, depending on whether their de-trended counterparts converge to the steady state increasing or decreasing over time -an information one can readily retrieve from Proposition 2, or the first row of Table 1 .
In turn, it is possible to infer the behavior of the growth rate of per-capita output, g y , by noticing that:
Using these results, the last two rows of Table 1 summarize the transitional dynamics of g y under adjacent complementarity. The growth rate 12 If, for given k0, z0 = ρ (A−g) α+g k0, there will be a transitional dynamics of the stock of habits; however, this will not affect consumption, capital, nor utility levels.
of per-capita output is decreasing in (z 0 /k 0 ), and can initially be negative for values of this ratio that are very high, while still being consistent with the upper bound mentioned in footnote 8. 13 For values of (z 0 /k 0 ) below (above) the threshold ρ(A−g) (ρ+g) , g y will be larger (smaller) than g, converging asymptotically to this constant, positive value. 
Finally, defining the saving rate as:
and noticing that (c/k) = (c/k) = (A − g) − (k/k), from (22) one has:
It follows that s will take on the constant value s * = (g/A) < 1 in balanced growth, and that its transitional dynamics will be qualitatively identical to that of the rate of growth of per-capita output: the saving rate will be initially "high", and decreasing over time, when
(ρ+g) , and relatively "low", but increasing toward its steady state level, for the opposite configuration of initial conditions.
It should be stressed that the evolution of growth and saving rates in Table 1 are also consistent with other models -for instance, the neoclassical model with time-separable preferences and an exogenous rate of technical progress. However, the latter implies that only relatively "rich" countriesthat is, countries starting out with a capital stock greater than their own 13 Since gy asymptotically approaches g > 0, gy < 0 is possible only during the first stages of the transition. Furthermore, the possibility of a negative growth rate depends not just on the size of the ratio (z0/k0), but also -through j and ψ -on the characteristics of the instantaneous utility function.
"de-trended" steady state level -will display increasing growth and saving rates. On the contrary, intertemporal dependence implies that, since it is the ratio between the initial conditions that determines the transitional dynamics, both kinds of evolution of growth and saving rates may be displayed by "rich" and "poor" countries alike. For instance, a country so poor at t = 0 as to have a stock of physical capital close to zero could also have a z 0 which is low in absolute terms, but high in relation to k 0 . This could be the case because of the lower bound placed on z by the level of subsistence consumption, or -embracing the extended interpretation of the law of accumulation of habits mentioned in Section 2 -because its z also reflects consumption standards in other, richer countries with which it interacts due to their geographic or cultural proximity. Starting out with a relatively high (z 0 /k 0 ), this country, no matter how "poor", is predicted to display increasing growth by our model.
An example, with implications for distribution dynamics
In this Section we consider a particular specification of preferences belonging to the intertemporally dependent class, first proposed by Constantinides (1990) in his attempt to solve the equity premium puzzle. We also compare our results with those stemming from a different departure from the assumption of CIES preferences, and investigate the implications of habitforming preferences for the evolution of wealth inequality along the process of economic growth. Consider the following instantaneous felicity function:
where σ > 0 and = 1, 1≥ b > 0. We also assume Ak 0 > bz 0 , so that, at time zero, each agent is endowed with enough capital to produce bz 0 . 14 Since lim
In addition, it is straightforward to verify that u z , u cc , u zz < 0, u cc u zz − u 2 cz = 0, assumption U4 is met and j = b [A + g + ρ (2 − b)] > 0, so we are always in the adjacent complementarity case.
Without loss of generality, and only to simplify the algebra, let us assume from here on that b ≡ 1, which implies that only the excess of consumption over the standard of living is valued. Given these assumptions, equilibrium consumption, habits and physical capital of the typical individual evolve according to:
where g = A−δ σ is the common steady state growth rate of the variables in the model.
The functional form under consideration has, in our opinion, several attractive properties. 15 First of all, and as shown in Appendix 3, the above equilibrium paths -that may also be derived using (17a)-(17c), and therefore a local approximation around the steady-state -coincide with the solution that one gets by solving system (14a)-(14c) directly. Therefore, they give the global equilibrium dynamics of the variables of interest.
The second attractive property of (23) concerns the fact that the results obtained with the time-separable, Stone-Geary preferences used in a growth setting by Christiano (1989) and Rebelo (1992) can be interpreted as a special case of our model with instantaneous utility given by (23) and ρ = 0. To appreciate this, first notice that, when preferences are given by (23) , the growth rate of per-capita output is:
15 The multiplicative specification of habits in preferences may have some advantages over the difference specification, since it may more easily account for individual consumption data, which may display high variability. Yet, the difference specification fits quite well aggregate data. Furthermore, Diaz, Pijoan-Mas and Rios-Rull (2003) provide simulations showing that the two specifications of habits lead to qualitatively similar results in terms of evolution of the distribution of wealth in a model where the technology available to the economy is described by a neoclassical producion function.
Notice that:
which is negative for (z 0 /k 0 ) ∈ (0,
, and positive for (z 0 /k 0 ) ∈ (
Following Rebelo (1992) , who works with an Ak technology and whose model is therefore closest to ours, now consider the Stone-Geary utility function:
where the positive constantc is the subsistence level of consumption, and k 0 >k,k ≡ (c/A). Since an Ak technology is assumed,k can be interpreted as the amount of capital needed to produce the subsistence level of consumption.
It is easy to show that, given this utility function, in equilibrium:
where g = A−δ σ . These are the same solutions that would be obtained assuming the functional form (23) and setting ρ = 0, so that z t = z 0 ≡c ∀t, implying that customary consumption is just constant at the subsistence levelc. However, a comparison between (25) and (26) makes clear thatbecause it allows for a changing level of z - (23) is generally consistent with a wider range of possibilities in terms of transitional dynamics toward the steady-state growth path. In particular, while ρ = 0 (and therefore a Stone-Geary utility function) yields the implication that the growth rate of per-capita output and the saving rate must necessarily be increasing over time along the transition, they can be either increasing or decreasing when ρ = 0 and the dynamics of habits feed back to consumption and accumulation choices. Since from the available empirical evidence it doesn't seem to emerge any clear, common pattern with which countries converge to their long run growth paths -with some countries seemingly converging "from above", and some "from below" -in our opinion this makes the model with intertemporally dependent preferences more appealing than the departure from CIES preferences represented by the use of a Stone-Geary utility function with a constant reference level of consumption. 16 Finally, the linearity in k 0 and z 0 of the equilibrium paths (24) allows one to assume heterogeneity in initial habits and capital holdings across individuals, and to investigate the evolution of the distribution of wealth along the process of economic growth. To see this, let us index by i = 1, 2, . . . , I the individuals populating the economy, and denote by k 0,i and z 0,i the endowments of capital and habits of individual i at time zero. While differences in initial capital holdings are straightforward to interpret, different initial habits stock may be seen as (i) the outcome of past consumption experiences of the various individuals in the economy ("history"), or (ii) the outcome of differences in the reference groups with which each individual interacts, or (iii) resulting from extra-economic factors (religion?) affecting the utility that different individuals derive from any given level of actual consumption.
Let us now define average capital holdings and habits as k t = (1/I) i k t,i and z t = (1/I) i k t,i , respectively. It is then easy to verify that, in equilibrium, c t,i , z t,i and k t,i will evolve according to (24) , with k 0,i and z 0,i replacing k 0 and z 0 , while (24) can now be interpreted as giving the dynamics of average consumption, habits and capital in the economy. In the terminology of Caselli and Ventura (2000) , our model therefore admits a representative individual, in the sense that the sum of all individuals behaves as if the economy contained a single consumer endowed with average capital and habits. Exactly because of this, it cannot be used to study how the initial distribution of wealth affects economic growth 17 ; however, it has interesting implications for the evolution of the distribution of wealth along the transition to the steady-state growth path. 16 For instance, Ben-David and Papell (1998) have recently tested for the existence of a significant structural break in the postwar growth rates of 74 countries. They find evidence of a positive trend break (post-break growth rates exceeding pre-break rates) for 8 countries; 46 countries exhibit a negative trend break (decreasing growth rates); the remaining countries show no significant break. A closer look to their result also shows that there is no clear correlation between the starting level of income of a country and the kind of break it exhibits (for instance, Uganda and the United Kingdom both belong to the "positive break" group). We certainly do not claim that habit formation is the only factor at work, here; however, we find it worth pointing out that habit-forming preferences are not inconsistent with these pieces of empirical evidence, and this contrary to what can be said about the other departure from time-separability -Stone-Geary preferencesone finds in the literature. 17 For a survey of the literature on the effects of inequality on economic growth, see Benabou (1996) .
To see this, in Figure 3 we compare the time path of the log of capital stock for various agents in the economy, assuming that they start out with different initial conditions for the state variables. In panel (a) we consider three agents who share the same z 0,i = z 0 , but endowed with different initial capital stocks: In both cases, if one defines convergence as the tendency for wealth differences to decrease over time, it is clear that the model with intertemporally dependent preferences yields the prediction that wealth differences will be increasing. However, if one realistically allows for differences in both k 0,i and z 0,i , it is consistent with a wider range of possibilities: they include divergence, as well as convergence and overtaking.
To illustrate some of these possibilities, in panel (c) of Figure 3 we assume k 0,1 > k 0,3 > k 0,2 -so that, from the standpoint of time 0, individual 1 is "rich", individual 2 is relatively poor, and individual 3 "middle-class" -and differences in z 0 leading to
. Although individual 1 starts out with a lot of capital, he also has a value of z 0 so high that his ratio of initial conditions is above the critical level ρ(A−g) (ρ+g) : his saving and growth rates will therefore be initially low, but increasing over time, as the results in Section 5 and (25) make clear. On the other hand, individual 2 is assumed to be better endowed with z than individual 3: this difference in initial consumption experience more than offsets the difference in capital endowments, so that (z 2 0 /k 2 0 ) > (z 3 0 /k 3 0 ). For the assumed configuration of initial conditions, the model predicts convergence between individuals 1 and 2, and divergence between 2 and 3. The wealth levels of individuals 1 and 3 will first converge, criss-cross, and then diverge.
To make these observations more precise, let us denote by k R t,i ≡ k t,i /k t the ratio of individual i's capital to the average one. From (24) , it follows that, in equilibrium, this ratio is
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Although relative capital holdings will be constant in steady state growth 18 , along the transition they can either increase or decrease.
Namely, by differentiating its expression with respect to time, it can be shown that k R t,i increases (decreases) along the transition to the balanced growth path whenever (z 0,i /k 0,i ) − (z 0 /k 0 ) < 0 (> 0). If individual i was initially richer than the mean (k 0,i > k 0 ), this means that he will further increase his distance from the mean if his initial ratio (z 0,i /k 0,i ) was below the average one (he will save more, and accumulate more capital, than the average agent in the economy); other things the same, this will push towards an increase in inequality. On the other hand, the relative wealth of an agent i initially poorer than the mean (k 0,i < k 0 ), but still characterized by an initial habits-to-capital ratio smaller than the average one, will increase as well, and for the same reason, leading to a decrease in inequality. Which of the two forces will prevail, and the way in which the steady state distribution of wealth will compare to the one observed at time zero, is something that depends on the initial distributions of habits and capital holdings. These effects, and the substantial mobility in the distribution of wealth that may be observed under habit formation 19 , are totally absent in the standard Ak model with time separable preferences (Rebelo, 1991) , where there is no transitional dynamics and the distribution of wealth always remains the same; they also differ from the results one gets with a Stone-Geary utility function and levels of reference consumptionc identical across individuals (see Chatterjee and Ravikumar, 1999) , which implies that saving rates are an increasing function of wealth, and therefore that inequality always increases along the transition. 20 The available empirical evidence 18 It is easy to verify that, in balanced growth, k
, a function of initial conditions only. 19 For instance, nothing precludes that an individual i who was initially richer than the mean (k0,i > k0) will end up with a k R i * < 1 -that is, that he will eventually become poorer than the mean. As clear from the expression for k R i * given in the previous footnote, this will happen if (z0,i − z0) > A(k0,i − k0) > 0. 20 A referee has correctly pointed out that, if in the Stone-Geary (SG) specification of preferences one allows for the threshold level of consumption to differ across agents, it is no longer true that the model with SG preferences and AK technology implies that inequality will always be increasing along the transition (and this because agents with different threshold levels of consumption will also have different levels of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution). It is therefore true that, at least from a qualitative point of view, with this extension of the SG specification of preferences one ends up with results for the dynamics of the distribution of wealth similar to those we derive in this Section assuming habit formation. However, we find it very hard to come up with a plausible explanation for the existence of constant and different levels of threshold consumption c in a closed-economy, growth environment such as the one we are investigating. As a on the growth-inequality nexus, arising from cross-country analyses, is not conclusive: for instance, according to Deininger and Squire (1996) , it does not seem to emerge any systematic relationship between growth and subsequent inequality. This is consistent with our model, where the distribution of initial habits plays a prominent role. Having said that, it is obvious that the simplicity of our model, especially for what concerns the production side of the economy, makes the exercise just outlined purely illustrative of the potential implications of a richer specification of preferences on the crosssectional holdings of capital. 21 
Concluding remarks
In this paper, we have provided a full characterization of the dynamics of the economy under internal habit formation and a linear technology. Rather than assuming a specific functional form for the instantaneous utility function, we have derived the restrictions that guarantee the existence of a balanced growth path, and introduced a simple graphical apparatus that greatly simplifies the study of the transitional dynamics starting from an arbitrary set of initial conditions on the state variables. We have also explored the implications of the model for the evolution of the cross-section of wealth, concluding that they are not inconsistent with the, still scarce, empirical evidence.
We think that the main contribution of the present paper lies in the analysis of the rich dynamics stemming from a plausible, and tractable, departure from the assumption of time-separable, isoelastic preferences. These dynamics should be superimposed on those implied by models that give a more realistic account of the production side of the economy, allow for the existence of barriers to the international diffusion and adoption of technology, take into account the role played by Governments and institutions and, more generally, the countless factors we have deliberately neglected, but that undoubtedly play an important role in the process of growth.
matter of fact, in our opinion the most plausible interpretation ofc is just "subsistence consumption". But ifc is subsistence consumption, then it is a sort of "biological level" that should not significantly differ across individuals -at least, individuals populating the same closed economy we are studying. 21 However, Diaz et al. (2003) show that habit formation is an important determinant of precautionary savings, and by this channel of the distribution of wealth, in economies with idiosyncratic uncertainty.
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Let's assume that u is homogeneous of degree ν in (c, z), so that u c is homogeneous of degree (ν − 1) in the same variables. Euler's theorem then implies:
so that the left-hand side of (A.1.5) is a constant. For a balanced growth path to be an equilibrium, the right-hand side of (A.1.5) must be constant as well. Since homogeneity of u implies that the term (u c /u z ) is a function of the ratio (c/z) only -a constant in steady state growth -, this requires:
or, using (A.1.2) and evaluating at the steady state the rate of change of the marginal utility of consumption,
Rearranging, one obtains ν = δ−A g +1, or the equivalent expression for the relationship between the degree of homogeneity of u and g given by equation (6) in the text. Notice that the requirement of positive steady state growth and Assumption T1 imply ν < 1.
Finally, it is easy to verify that, in steady state growth, (μ/µ) = (λ/λ) = δ−A. It follows that, for a balanced growth path to satisfy the transversality conditions associated with problem (P1), lim t→∞ e −δt λ t k t = 0, lim t→∞ e −δt µ t z t = 0, one must have A > g. We restrict the parameters in the model so as to make sure that this inequality always holds, implying that the balanced growth path just characterized satisfies all the necessary -and, given our assumptions, sufficient -conditions for an optimum.
Appendix 2 -Derivation of equations (17a)-(17c)
Sincek does not enter (14a)-(14b), we begin our local analysis of the equilibrium dynamics associated with system (14) by focusing on the pair (c,z). The dynamics ofk follows recursively, through (14c).
When j < 0, the jacobian determinant is negative, and we have two real roots of opposite sign. To make sure that the system is saddlepath stable also in the case of adjacent complementarity (j > 0) on which we focus in the text, we assume: ρj < (A + ρ)(ρ + g), which amounts to the restriction on j in ( , any value of j consistent with saddlepath stability is also consistent with concavity of u, and the upper bound that this assumption imposes on j (see (A.2.3) ).
We shall denote by ζ the positive characteristic root associated with the linearized version of system (14) , and, as stated in the text, by −ψ the negative one:
Notice that, although j depends on the second partial derivatives of u evaluated at the steady state (c * ,z * ), homogeneity of u implies that these roots are not a function of the initial conditions (k 0 , z 0 ). In fact, While the second one is always positive, the sign of ω 1 depends on that of (ρ + g − ψ), which is the same as the sign of j. To see this, notice that, using (A.2.4):
